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Collective emotion and the function of expressive behaviour 
1. Introduction 
It is uncontroversial that emotion has a strongly social character. Our emotional responses 
are profoundly influenced by the behaviour and expectations of people around us. Moreover, many 
emotions have social functions: they enable us to sustain relationships with others and to cope with 
a range of social challenges (see Helm, this volume). More controversially, it is sometimes suggested 
that emotional responses can themselves be social phenomena: that emotions can sometimes be 
experienced collectively in some sense. Whether we can make interesting sense of this claim is a 
question that is attracting increasing attention from philosophers, reflecting both a flourishing 
literature in the philosophy of emotion and a vigorous debate about other collective phenomena – 
collective action and collective cognition, in particular.1 
In this chapter, I shall explore a new way of approaching this question. Rather than 
beginning by asking whether emotions themselves can be collective, I shall focus, first, on particular 
emotional phenomena – specifically, on emotional actions and on processes of reasoning and 
reflection that arise in the course of an emotional response. I want to consider whether these 
phenomena can sometimes occur collectively. As I shall explain, this is an interesting question in its 
own right; moreover, approaching the issue in this way suggests a new way of understanding the 
claim that emotions themselves can sometimes be collective. As we shall see, investigating these 
phenomena involves understanding the nature and function of expressive behaviour. Hence, a 
discussion of expressive behaviour will play a crucial role in what follows. 
I begin, in section 2, by explaining why it might be thought that emotions cannot be 
collective in any interesting sense, and by briefly considering some possible responses to this worry. 
In section 3, I introduce the question that is my primary focus in this chapter: I explain why it is an 
interesting question, and how it relates to the broader debate about collective emotion. In section 4, 
I sketch an account of expressive behaviour; and in sections 5 and 6, I draw on this account in 
describing some potential cases of collective emotional action and reflection. I end, in section 7, I by 
considering what conclusions might be drawn from these cases. 
 
  
                                                          
1 For recent discussions of collective emotion, see Gilbert (2002; 2014); Schmid (2009); Huebner 
(2013); Salmela (2012); Slaby (2014). 
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2. Approaches to collective emotion 
People often talk as if there can be collective subjects of emotion: crowds become enraged; 
communities grieve; nations are proud of their history. Still, there are ways of understanding these 
claims without supposing that crowds or communities or nations are themselves subjects of 
emotion. The claim that a community is grieving, for example, can be understood merely as 
shorthand for the claim that most of its members are grieving. Indeed, the suggestion that there can 
be collective emotions in any more robust sense might well look doomed from the start. This is 
because (it is assumed) emotions are conscious mental states, with a particular phenomenal 
character; conscious states, it is widely supposed, can be attributed only to individuals.  
There seems, then, to be a simple argument against the view that an emotion can be 
attributed to a group: 
P1:  An emotion is a conscious mental state, characterised by a certain kind of 
phenomenal character.  
P2:  Only individuals can have conscious mental states. 
Conclusion:  So, only individuals can have emotions (emotional individualism). 
In this section, I shall review, very briefly, three possible responses to this argument. Because I need 
to be brief, I cannot do justice to the details of the views mentioned here; hence, there remains 
much more to be said about the issues raised in this section. My aim is just to provide some 
background to the discussion that follows, and to motivate a search for an alternative approach.  
The simple argument is not decisive: both premises are open to question. Consider for 
example, Margaret Gilbert’s well known account of collective guilt. According to Gilbert (2002; 
2014), collective guilt arises when a group of people (a Board of Directors, say) are jointly committed 
to behaving in certain ways – apologising, making reparations – when they agree that they have 
made some poor collective decision. As she acknowledges, they might do this without experiencing 
any feelings (‘pangs or twinges’) of guilt. Still, she argues, this is not an objection to her account. 
Emotions, she says, do not always involve feelings; in other words, they do not always have a 
particular phenomenal character (Gilbert, 2002: 119-120). Hence, Gilbert seems to reject P1. 
 However, it is not clear that P1 can plausibly be defeated in this way.  As many theorists of 
emotion have pointed out, the phenomenal character of an emotional response is not easily viewed 
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as a mere accoutrement of emotion.2 Rather it reflects key features of the response as a whole. 
These include not only changes taking place in the subject’s body but also a range of psychological 
changes: the subject’s intense attentional focus on the situation; how the scene looks and sounds; 
the thoughts racing through their head; the urgent desire to act. Were many of these features 
missing, it is hard to say why the response should be viewed as an emotional response. Plausibly, 
then, the absence of phenomenology is not merely the absence of an optional extra: it puts serious 
pressure on the claim that collective guilt, as Gilbert describes it, is a type of emotion.3   
Another option might be to reject P2. This option has recently been investigated by Bryce 
Huebner (2013). It is at least conceivable, Huebner (2013: 112) suggests, that we might one day 
encounter a collective so vast and tightly organised that it is able to match the computational 
complexity of the human brain; if so, we could have reason to believe that it was capable of 
subjective experience. Arguably, then, P2 should be more cautiously phrased. Still, as Huebner also 
points out, there is no reason to think that groups of the kind we ordinarily encounter (Boards of 
Directors, teams of scientists) are sufficiently large or complex to generate conscious experience. 
Hence, assuming P1 is correct, it looks as if collective emotion remains at best a theoretical 
possibility.4 
In contrast, Mikko Salmela (2012) does not try to challenge the simple argument. Instead, he 
sets out to develop a robust notion of shared emotion, entirely compatible with emotional 
individualism (Salmela, 2012: 44). Cases of shared emotion, he suggests, involve four elements: 
1. The emotional responses of those involved are grounded in the same concern (for 
example, the success of a football club). 
2. The individuals involved have the same type of emotional response, and undergo 
similar physiological, psychological and behavioural changes. 
3. Mechanisms of attentional deployment, emotional contagion, facial mimicry and 
behavioural entrainment help to regulate and intensify the emotional responses of 
the individuals involved. 
4. The individuals involved are aware that they share the same emotion (Salmela, 2012: 
39-42).  
                                                          
2 See, for example, Goldie (2000: 50-83); Montague (2006); Helm (2009). The worry that Gilbert 
underestimates the importance of emotional phenomenology has been voiced by a number of 
commentators: see particularly Wilkins (2002); Konzelmann Ziv (2009). 
3 Some theorists might reject P1 on the grounds that bodily changes, rather than phenomenology, is 
central to emotion (see Sias and Bar-On, this volume.) This move, though, would not help Gilbert. 
4 However, Huebner (2013: 244) also seems to suggest that a group such as an election campaign 
team can, in certain circumstances, be anxious or afraid. Presumably, then, he also rejects P1. 
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This concept of shared emotion, Salmela points out, is a matter of degree. In the strongest cases, he 
suggests, those involved are collectively committed to the concern that grounds the emotion; the 
concern is itself collective (‘our jointly achieved success’); and the emotional response is relatively 
intense. An example might be the mutually contagious joy of the members of a football team as they 
stand together on the pitch having just won an important trophy for the club they all love (Salmela, 
2012: 42-3).  
Salmela, then, offers a middle path: his concept of shared emotion goes well beyond the 
boring thought that two people can experience the same type of emotion; nevertheless, his account 
is perfectly compatible with emotional individualism. The idea that there is room for a middle path 
seems right; moreover, Salmela’s account looks promising. Still, there remains scope to question 
whether his account of shared emotion could be extended or improved: in particular, we might ask 
whether the four elements he identifies the right ones. I shall return to this question at the end. 
There remains, too, a more fundamental question. Should we now rest content with 
(something like) Salmela’s notion? Or are there possibilities yet to explore – possibilities that might 
loosen the grip of emotional individualism? In what follows, I shall pursue this further question: in 
particular, I shall focus on the possibility that there are collective emotional phenomena.5 In the next 
section, I shall explain what I mean by this, and why I think that this possibility is worth investigating. 
3. Collective emotional phenomena? 
Getting emotional is complicated: it might involve changes to heart rate and skin 
conductance; changes to attention and motivation; memories, imaginings and ruminations; blushing, 
frowning, sighing, protesting, celebrating, fleeing a bear. Characteristically, these changes are 
generated by an evaluation of the situation; and, together, they generate a conscious emotional 
experience, with a specific phenomenal character. When I use the term ‘emotion phenomena’ in 
what follows, it is these changes – physiological, psychological or behavioural – that I have in mind. 
Emotional phenomena, then, include emotional evaluations, emotional feelings, emotional desires 
emotional expressions, emotional actions, and so on. Together, these changes form a complex 
emotional response – for example, an episode of fear (Price 2012; 2015). 6 
To describe something as an emotional phenomenon is not to identify it as an emotion or 
even as a component of an emotion. Some emotional phenomena might be classed as causes or 
                                                          
5 In what follows, I use the term ‘shared’ when I am referring to a notion that, like Salmela’s, is 
compatible with emotional individualism; I use the term ‘collective’ when I am referring to the idea 
that emotions or emotional phenomena can sometimes be attributed to groups. 
6 Elsewhere (Price 2012; 2015), I use the term ‘emotional phenomenon’ to refer to complex 
emotional responses too. I am using the term a little more narrowly here. 
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effects of the emotion. Hence, the claim that there can be collective emotional phenomena is not 
equivalent to the claim that there can be collective emotions, as such. Nevertheless, it is an 
interesting claim in its own right. Suppose, for example, that it could be shown that some emotional 
actions are collective actions: such a finding would almost certainly have significant implications for 
the kinds of intentional content that emotional evaluations can have, for the kinds of emotional 
motivations there can be, and for the functions of other emotional phenomena, such as expressive 
behaviour. Moreover, we might well want to take account of this finding in explaining what it is for 
an emotion to be shared, in Salmela’s sense. 
Moreover, such a finding may yet have a bearing on whether emotions themselves can be 
collective. To explain why, I need to distinguish some different ways of answering the question 
‘What is an emotion?’  
(a) Single component theories. Some theorists identify emotions with a single emotional 
phenomenon. William James (1890) famously held that emotions are bodily feelings. More 
recently, many theorists have taken emotions to be emotional evaluations (though they 
disagree about what these evaluations are).7  
(b) Complex process theories. Peter Goldie (2000: 12-14) argues that an emotion is a complex 
process, which has many components, including perceptions, thoughts, feelings, 
physiological changes and a variety of emotional and behavioural dispositions. Jenefer 
Robinson (2005: 57-61) also holds that an emotion is a process, in which an affective 
appraisal triggers physiological and motor changes, action tendencies, changes in vocal and 
facial expression, and subsequent cognitive monitoring of the situation.8 Among 
psychologists, Paul Ekman (1982; 1992) has long argued that emotions are complex, 
organised responses involving a range of physiological, behavioural and psychological 
changes.  
(c) An adjectivalist account. My own view is different again. As I have explained elsewhere 
(Price, 2012; 2015), I am not convinced that the question ‘What is an emotion?’ can be 
settled in any satisfying way. Hence, I prefer to do my theorising about emotional 
phenomena – emotional evaluations, feelings, actions, and so on – and about the complex 
emotional responses that they compose. We can study these things, I want to say, without 
needing to decide which of them constitutes the emotion.  
                                                          
7 This view is endorsed by Solomon (1993); Helm (2009); Roberts (2003); Prinz (2004) among many 
others. 
8 Compare Salmela (2012: 42). 
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Focus, first, on complex process theories. These theories tend to differ from single 
component theories in one crucial respect: while single component theorists tend to identify 
emotions with some kind of mental state (feelings or evaluations), complex process theorists 
generally allow that emotions include at least some non-psychological components. Admittedly, 
there is some disagreement about what the components of an emotion are. As I mentioned above, 
Robinson, Salmela and Ekman include certain kinds of expressive behaviour, while expressive 
behaviour is explicitly excluded by Goldie (2000: 13). 9 Still, they all agree that emotions include at 
least some non-psychological phenomena. Hence, none of them are committed to P1: they hold that 
emotions include a mix of psychological and non-psychological components. As a result, none of 
them should endorse the simple argument for emotional individualism.  
Still, this does not entail that they should reject emotional individualism as such: it may yet 
turn out that emotions are necessarily confined to individual bodies, if not to individual minds. 
Moreover, they all agree that emotions have some psychological components: hence, they cannot 
suppose that an emotion could be wholly collective. Nevertheless, there remains an interesting 
possibility – that emotions can be partly collective. Suppose, for example, there is some 
phenomenon – emotional reflection, say – that a complex process theorist normally regards as a 
component of emotion. Suppose, too, that it is established that emotional reflection sometimes 
occurs within groups, rather than individuals. This raises the possibility that such a process of 
collective reflection might itself be a component of an emotion. 
At first blush, this suggestion certainly sounds odd. However, it sounds less odd if we take 
seriously the idea that emotions are processes. Processes can evolve in all kinds of ways: they can 
start in one place and end in another; they can involve different objects or people at different times; 
they can overlap, in part, with other processes going on at the same time. Suppose, for example, 
that two neighbours, Babs and Bob, are both busy tidying their gardens: most of the time they work 
separately, but they work together to trim the dividing hedge. Arguably, there are two (partly 
overlapping) processes here – Bob tidying his garden and Babs tidying hers – each of which includes 
their trimming the hedge together. The suggestion is that emotions, too, might sometimes include a 
collective stage.  
                                                          
9 For Ekman (1992) and Robinson (2005), the emotion consists of all the changes that are 
automatically triggered by the emotional appraisal: this, they think, includes non-voluntary 
expressive behaviour. I am not altogether clear why Goldie draws the line exactly where he does. 
The thought may simply be that we intuitively regard any kind of emotional behaviour as caused by, 
rather than part of, the emotion. For a worry about this approach, see Price (2012: 326-28). 
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For me, as an adjectivalist, the issue is slightly different. Because I take no particular view 
about what an emotion is, the question whether there can be collective emotions, as such, does not 
arise. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, I am certainly interested in understanding emotional 
responses. An emotional response, I take it, is a complex process: it has a particular function and 
structure; and it includes both psychological and non-psychological components (Price, 2015: 2-8). 
Moreover, as I am using the term, an emotional response includes all the emotional phenomena 
that the subject produces or undergoes. These will include emotional phenomena that complex 
process theorists do not tend to regard as components of emotions. Consider, for example, non-
expressive emotional actions (fleeing a bear or throwing a punch, say): none of the complex process 
theorists mentioned above list these emotional actions as components of emotions. Nevertheless, 
such actions will certainly be part of the broader emotional response. Hence, the discovery that 
there can be collective emotional phenomena would certainly raise the possibility that emotional 
responses are sometimes partly collective – whatever those phenomena turn out to be. 
Can there be collective emotional phenomena? As will become clear in sections 5 and 6, my 
answer to this question depends on some particular claims about the function of expressive 
behaviour. My next task, then, is to make those claims. 
4. Expressive behaviour 
The term ‘expressive behaviour’ has been understood in many ways in the philosophical 
literature.10 Here, I shall explain how I understand the term.  
We might distinguish between three kinds of emotional behaviour: 
1. Behaviour aimed at dealing with the particular challenge or opportunity that has 
elicited the emotion. This might include angrily thumping an adversary, fearfully 
fleeing a bear, guiltily buying flowers. It also includes certain kinds of cognitive 
behaviour: anxiously fretting about a problem, triumphantly gloating over a victory.  
2. Behaviour aimed at managing one’s emotional response. This might include venting 
your frustration by swearing; blocking your ears to shut out the awful sound; 
working yourself up into a rage. 
3. Expressive behaviour. This might include blushing; frowning; whimpering; turning a 
cartwheel; saying ‘Oh God, it’s coming this way!’; stroking someone’s face; wearing a 
black armband; sending flowers. 
                                                          
10 For some recent discussions, see Davies (1988), Goldie (2000), Green (2007. 
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Emotional behaviour often belongs to more than one of these categories. As I list the crimes 
of an adversary to a mutual acquaintance, I may be expressing my resentment, amplifying it and 
getting my revenge all at the same time. In particular, expressing an emotion is often a way of 
resolving the situation: expressing anger, for example, can be a way of deterring further offence; 
expressing love can be a way of cementing a bond. Nevertheless, not all emotional behaviour is 
expressive: fleeing a bear, for example, manifests fear, but it would seem odd to say that it expresses 
it. 
Like other kinds of emotional behaviour, expressive behaviour is not all of a kind. Some of 
the examples listed above are automatic, involuntary behaviours, while others are intentional 
actions. Some seem to be hard-wired, while others presuppose a sophisticated background of 
cultural conventions, including linguistic or symbolic conventions. In other cases, expressive 
behaviour can be quite personal, even idiosyncratic: expressing one’s rage by planting tulips, say. 
Given the diversity of expressive behaviours, we might wonder what they have in common. 
First, expressive behaviour is itself emotional behaviour: it is either an involuntary response 
triggered by an emotional evaluation or a voluntary action motivated by an emotional desire. Hence, 
a ‘thank you’ present expresses my gratitude only if I give it out of gratitude – and not, say, out of 
duty. For the same reason, there is a difference between expressing emotion and merely reporting 
it. As we have seen, though, not all kinds of emotional behaviour count as expressive behaviour: 
fleeing a bear, for example, is not expressive behaviour. A natural explanation for this is that 
describing behaviour as expressive implies that it has a meaning: expressive behaviour is supposed 
to signal or convey how the subject feels. This might be taken to imply that expressive behaviour 
always has a communicative function: it functions to communicate one’s emotional response to 
others.11 This certainly seems right in some cases. However, there are two qualifications to make. 
First, expressive behaviour does not always express the subject’s emotional response 
overall: some expressive behaviour is concerned only with a specific component of the response. 
Crying out ‘Oh God, it’s coming this way!’ might be described as expressing fear; more precisely, 
though, it expresses a particular fearful thought. Similarly, nervously tapping one’s watch might 
express an anxious desire to leave. This point is particularly important in accounting for expressive 
behaviour that is symbolic in character. Goldie (2000: 134-5) describes a husband angrily smashing 
his wife’s favourite vase in front of her. One possibility, he suggests, is that his smashing the vase 
                                                          
11 Here, I am using the term ‘communication’ in a broad sense to include both intentional acts of 
communication (for example, telling someone the time) and non-intentional behaviour (for example, 
bees’ waggle dances). For a detailed account of expressive behaviour as communicative in character, 
see Green (2007). 
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expresses, not simply his anger, but his angry desire to harm her: it does this by symbolising the 
harm he wants to do. On another scenario, smashing the vase might express an angry thought – for 
example, that the marriage is broken beyond repair.  
Secondly, it can be questioned whether all expressive behaviour is communicative 
behaviour. Consider Hursthouse’s (1991) example of angry Jane who grabs a photograph of her rival, 
Joan, and scratches out the eyes. Jane’s behaviour does not seem to have a communicative 
character: we are not supposed to imagine that Jane damages the photograph in front of Joan – or 
anyone else. Goldie (2000: 130) suggests that Jane’s behaviour can be understood as a case of wish 
fulfilment. Understood in this way, her behaviour has no particular function: it simply reflects the 
brute psychological fact that when people cannot fulfil some strong desire, they sometimes take 
satisfaction in symbolically acting it out. Nevertheless, Goldie classes this as a case of expressive 
behaviour: in symbolically acting out her wish, he suggests, Jane thereby expresses it (Goldie, 2000: 
129-134).12 
Is this right? I agree that Jane’s behaviour might well be a case of wish fulfilment; but, if so, I 
am not sure that her behaviour should be said to express her wish. Earlier, I suggested that 
expressive behaviour is naturally viewed as behaviour that is supposed to signal or convey the 
subject’s emotional response. If Jane is simply acting out her wish for her own satisfaction, her 
behaviour certainly manifests her wish; but it does not seem to express it, in this sense.  
However, there is another possible explanation for Jane’s behaviour – one that makes better 
sense of the idea that this is expressive behaviour. Sometimes, expressing a wish is not a way of 
communicating it to others, but rather a way of articulating it to oneself. Craving for chocolate, for 
example, I mutter: ‘I wish I had some chocolate right now!’ My utterance need not be aimed at 
anyone else: it might just be a way of articulating my desire – of holding it in consciousness. 
Similarly, I might close my eyes and imagine the taste, not because this satisfies my desire (far from 
it), but just as a way of attending to it: ‘It is this!’, I say to myself, ‘It is this that I crave!’ Conceivably, 
this might be what Jane is doing when she attacks the photograph: ‘This!’ she says, ‘This is what I 
want to do to you!’ On this scenario, Jane’s behaviour can be regarded as expressing her desire – not 
because her behaviour has a communicative function, but because it functions to articulate her 
emotional desire.13 In other cases, expressive behaviour might articulate an emotional thought: by 
casting the photograph aside, for example, Jane might articulate the thought that Joan is someone 
                                                          
12 Compare Green (2007: 36-7). 
13 Compare Slaby (2014:36). 
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of no consequence. (Compare Bennett’s suggestion, this volume, that expressive behaviour may be 
aimed at acknowledging or reflecting what is significant about the situation.) 
I have suggested that expressive behaviour is highly diverse. It includes both automatic 
responses and intentional actions; it embraces hard-wired behaviours, conventional gestures and 
idiosyncratic performances, interpretable only by one’s nearest and dearest. What these cases have 
in common is (a) that they are cases of emotional behaviour; and (b) that they function to 
communicate or articulate something about the subject’s emotional response – either the subject’s 
response overall, or a specific emotional thought or desire. In the next two sections, I shall describe 
two possible kinds of collective emotional phenomenon: collective emotional action and collective 
emotional cognition, drawing on the account of expressive behaviour sketched here.  
5. Collective emotional action 
 Henry is a technician in a medium-sized company. Year on year, the managers have awarded 
themselves large bonuses, citing rising profits. This morning, Henry’s manager, Sandra, has 
announced that, for the third year running, none of the technical staff will receive a rise. Having read 
Sandra’s memo, Henry looks round at his colleagues and sees expressions of disbelief and anger on 
their faces. One flings herself angrily back in her seat, while another slams his hand on his desk. 
Angry mutterings develop into animated discussion. Eventually, action emerges: the technicians 
march together to Sandra’s office to demand that the decision is reversed.  
On the face of it, this looks very much like a case of collective action. Admittedly, there is 
some dispute about what exactly is required for genuinely collective action. Still, the current 
consensus seems to be that we can answer this question without attributing beliefs or intentions to 
the group itself, but rather by appealing to the goals, perceptions and dispositions of its individual 
members. 14 In this case, the following points all seem significant:  
1. Henry and his colleagues each act with roughly the same goal (getting the decision 
reversed).  
2. Each is disposed to accept the others’ help, and to coordinate their behaviour with 
the others, in order to achieve this goal.  
3. Each is aware that the members of the group share this goal and these dispositions.  
Given all this, I would suggest, it makes sense to say, not just that each individual protested, but also 
that the group itself protested as a body.  
                                                          
14 For some recent accounts of this kind, see Bratman (1993); Tuomela (2005); Tollefsen (2005); 
Isaacs (2011).  
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However, to establish that this is a case of collective action is not to establish that this is a 
case of collective emotional action. Before we can settle this there are two further hurdles to 
overcome.  
First, for an action to count as an emotional action, collective or otherwise, it must be done 
out of emotion: it must be motivated by emotional desires or urges. The technicians’ indignant 
response certainly involves an urge to protest; but it is not clear that we can appeal to this urge to 
explain why they protested together. It might be thought, rather, that the situation must have 
developed in something like the following way: having read Sandra’s memo, each technician was 
seized by an indignant urge to go and personally remonstrate with Sandra; on reflection, however, 
each realised that they could achieve nothing by acting alone; as a result, they each restrained their 
immediate impulse to confront Sandra, and instead consulted each other – eventually agreeing to 
mount their protest together. Hence (the worry goes) when the technicians decide to protest as a 
body, they are not acting on their initial, indignant urge, but rather on a more considered desire to 
ensure that their voices are heard. 
However, there is another possibility. Suppose that there is a particular type of righteous 
anger – one that that motivates the subject, not merely to resist the wrong, but to resist it in concert 
with others. (In what follows, I shall commandeer the term ‘outrage’ as a label for this form of 
anger.)  The suggestion that there is such a type of anger strikes me as quite plausible. Certainly, it is 
easy to see how people would benefit by having an emotional propensity of this kind: when a 
perpetrator is too powerful, or insouciant, to be tackled by one person acting alone, people would 
do well to be motivated to act together with others. Moreover, angry people do often seem to have 
an urge to broadcast their wrongs – heatedly drawing others’ attention to the situation and trying to 
gather others to their cause. Indeed, it seems plausible that there are other emotional responses of 
this kind: triumphant joy, for example, often seems to move people to celebrate with others; and it 
is not hard to imagine how people might benefit from this impulse. Suppose, then, that the 
technicians respond to Sandra’s memo with outrage, in this sense. If so, it is possible that what 
motivated their joint protest is not a considered desire to be heard, but an outraged urge to act 
together. Hence, assuming that this is a real possibility, we can make room for the idea that the 
technicians protest together out of emotion.   
There is a second hurdle to jump. The technicians, we are supposing, share an outraged 
urge, not merely to protest, but to protest together. Still, they might not yet be in a position to act 
effectively on this motivation: they may first need to decide exactly what to do. This might well 
require an explicit process of planning and coordination. Once again, the worry will be that this will 
require them to restrain their outrage, so that they can discuss calmly how to organise themselves. 
13 
 
But if so, this looks problematic: for on this scenario, it is not altogether clear that their protest, 
when they mount it, is an emotional action, or at least not a purely emotional action. Even if their 
protest was initially motivated by an outraged urge to protest – and even if this urge continues to 
strengthen their resolve – nevertheless, by the time they actually mount their protest, they are not 
acting directly on this urge, but rather on a plan that has been formulated, and endorsed, in cold 
blood. Matters would be different, it seems, if we could suppose that their planning is not calm at 
all, but emotional – directed by outraged thoughts, imaginings and desires – just as someone might 
angrily plan an act of personal revenge.  If so, it would be much clearer that their protest is an 
outraged protest – motivated, planned and performed wholly in the grip of emotion.  
How, though, could this come about? The answer, I take it, lies with expressive behaviour: 
for it is through expressive behaviour that the technicians are able to communicate their outraged 
thoughts and desires – and to do this heatedly, rather than calming reporting their emotional state. 
John Michael (2011) has already offered a helpful analysis of the ways in which expressive behaviour 
might facilitate collective action. By allowing us to recognise others’ emotions, Michael suggests, 
expressive behaviour helps each individual to predict what the others are likely to do; and the 
emotional rapport shared by the members of a group may lead them, quite unconsciously, to move 
in alignment. Michael’s concerns, however, are not quite the same as mine: he is concerned with 
collective action in general, while I am concerned only with collective emotional action. As a result, 
my account departs (at least in emphasis) from his in two specific ways.  
First, I want to stress the importance of verbal or symbolic expressions of specific emotional 
thoughts and desires. This is because I want to allow that there can be collective emotional actions 
of a relatively sophisticated kind. Almost certainly, planning and coordinating these actions will 
require the participants to communicate, not just the broad tenor of their emotional response, but 
specific emotional thoughts, imaginings and desires. (These might include, for example, thoughts 
about what might make for a particularly telling protest, or the desire to get others involved.) 
Secondly, Michael is chiefly concerned with the way in which expressive behaviour facilitates 
collective action. In contrast, I want to stress that, when it comes to collective emotional action, the 
role of expressive behaviour is not only causal, but also constitutive. It is partly because the 
technicians’ protest was planned in the grip of outrage – planned, that is, in response to behaviour 
that expressed outraged thoughts and desires – that it counts as a clear case of collective emotional 
action. 
I have argued that some cases of collective action might turn out to be cases of collective 
emotional action. This will be possible, provided that there are some types of emotional response 
that motivate people to act together. Moreover, if we are to allow for collective emotional actions of 
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any sophistication, we must also allow that collective actions can be planned and coordinated in an 
emotional way. This is possible, I have suggested, because people can employ expressive behaviour 
in planning actions of these kinds. 
6. Collective emotional cognition 
Emotional responses frequently involve processes of thought or reasoning. Most obviously, 
they involve processes of practical reasoning: in anxiety or anger, people cast around for a way to 
avert the catastrophe or redress the wrong. Other types of emotional response characteristically 
involve an element of reflection or rumination: in grief, the subject is often moved to reflect on their 
loss – to try to understand what they have lost and why (Price 2010).  Anxious fretting and sorrowful 
reflection are often solitary activities. We might wonder, though, whether emotional cognition can 
sometimes be collective.  
Questions about collective cognition have often been pursued within the context of a wider 
debate about collective intentionality: it is often thought that to describe a cognitive process as 
collective implies ascribing beliefs or intentions to groups. 15 However, this is not the only way in 
which collective cognition can be understood. Ronald Giere (2002) has argued that we can 
understand collective cognition without positing collective psychological states: the only 
psychological states required are those of the individual members of the group. Indeed, we might try 
to model collective cognition much as we modelled collective action in the last section: the idea will 
be that people can work together to solve a problem or to form a plan, just as they can work 
together to mount a protest.  
With that in mind, it is not hard to find possible examples of collective emotional cognition. 
Consider, first, the case of Henry and his colleagues: to act together, they must coordinate their 
behaviour, and – as we have seen – this may involve a degree of explicit planning. As I suggested in 
the previous section, to the extent that this involves the expression of emotional desires and 
thoughts, this will be a case of emotional planning. Arguably, there can be cases of collective 
reflection too. Consider the case of grief: in many cultures, rituals of mourning encourage the 
bereaved to reflect together – for example, by exchanging memories of the deceased. Exchanging 
memories can be comforting, but arguably, it also has an epistemic function: by reflecting together, 
the mourners are able to reach a shared understanding of their loss.  
In the case just described, the mourners’ expressive behaviour plays a communicative role: it 
enables them to communicate their sad thoughts. In other cases, it seems more natural to think of 
                                                          
15 For some discussions, see Hutchins (1995); List (2008); Huebner (2013).  
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the process as functioning to articulate a certain way of understanding what has occurred. This 
makes better sense of cases in which mourners come together to perform some ritual action. 
Suppose, for example, that a community has come together to build a cairn for the deceased – 
expressing, perhaps, some sad but consoling thought. As each individual solemnly adds a stone to 
the cairn, it would seem strange to think of their behaviour as communicating this thought to the 
others – each contributing some piece of information that the others lack. Rather it seems more 
natural to think of their behaviour as collectively highlighting, or even endorsing, that thought: 
together, they are framing the situation in a certain way. (Again, compare Bennett, this volume.16) 
I have suggested, then, that we can make room for the idea of collective emotional cognition 
without positing collective psychological states. All these cases essentially involve expressive 
behaviour. Indeed, understanding the role of expressive behaviour in both communicating and 
articulating emotional thoughts and desires can help us to recognise the different forms that 
collective emotional cognition might take. 
7. Shared and collective emotion 
In the last two sections, I have identified two possible kinds of collective emotional 
phenomena: collective emotional action and collective emotional cognition. To do this, I have 
stressed, involves taking account of our capacity to express emotion in diverse and sometimes 
nuanced ways. I shall end by considering what further conclusions we might draw. 
I shall start with Salmela’s notion of shared emotion. As we saw, Salmela takes this to 
involve four elements: sameness of concern, sameness of response, mutual regulation and mutual 
awareness. He does not, though, accord a role to emotional action or cognition. I would like to 
suggest that these phenomena also have a role to play in cases of shared emotion. Consider 
Salmela’s example of a team’s joy at winning a trophy together. Imagine, first, that the players are 
standing together, aware of each other’s feelings, and physically attuned to each other, just as he 
describes; moreover, each player is excitedly thinking about the team’s victory and engaging in 
individual acts of celebration – dancing about and punching the air. Contrast this with a case in 
which the players are doing all these things, but also celebrating together – hugging each other and 
dancing around as a group; imagine, too, that they are excitedly discussing their victory, creating a 
shared understanding of their achievement. Plausibly, the second case represents a significantly 
more robust example of shared joy than the first. There is scope, then, to extend Salmela’s analysis 
to take account of these further aspects of an emotional response. Moreover, this might well involve 
                                                          
16 Indeed, it was hearing an earlier version of Bennett’s paper at a workshop on ‘Emotion and 
Expression’ at the University of Manchester in 2012 that drew my attention to this kind of case. 
16 
 
reconsidering the role of expressive behaviour in cases of shared emotion. For as we have seen, 
collective emotional action and cognition characteristically depend, not only on the sub-personal 
processes emphasised by Salmela, but also on the verbal or symbolic expression of specific 
emotional desires and thoughts.  
In section 3, I raised a further possibility: that complex emotional responses, perhaps even 
emotions themselves, might sometimes include a collective stage. Consider, first, an emotional 
response – an episode of outrage, say. The thought will be that, just as an episode of indignation 
might include some individual act of protest, so Henry’s outraged response includes the collective 
protest mounted by Henry and his colleagues.  
It might be objected that this is not the right thing to say. This is because there is a more 
modest alternative available: Henry’s outraged response, we should say, includes, not the collective 
protest, but only Henry’s individual participation in the protest. However, there is scope to resist this 
suggestion. To do this, we need to take seriously the idea that Henry’s outraged response is a 
process, which has a particular function, and which is supposed to unfold in a particular way. The 
function of Henry’s outrage is not, presumably, to ensure that he participates in redressing the 
wrong, but to ensure that the wrong is redressed – something Henry cannot achieve alone. Thus, 
what would satisfy Henry’s outrage – what would bring it to its proper conclusion – is not Henry’s 
participation in redressing the wrong,17 but – more simply – the fact that he and his colleagues got 
the decision reversed. Similarly, in a case of collective reflection, it is not my participating in some 
collective act of reflection that helps me to move on in my grief, but – more simply – the fact that we 
have found, together, a way to make sense of our loss. The thought is, then, that, if we want to 
understand how these emotional responses unfold and how, ultimately, they are supposed to be 
resolved, we need to view these collective phenomena themselves as stages in the process.   
This is as far as an adjectivalist can go. Might a complex process theorist say more? As I 
explained earlier, it is open to a complex process theorist to claim that emotions themselves might 
sometimes be partly collective. They might have reason to do this, I suggested, if it turned out that 
some phenomenon that they would normally regard as a component of emotion can sometimes be 
attributed to a group. On this criterion, the possibility of collective emotional actions looks like a red 
herring; for, as I explained earlier, complex process theorists do not generally view non-expressive 
emotional actions as components of emotions.18 Cases of collective emotional cognition, however, 
hold more promise. Goldie, at least, suggests that thoughts are components of emotions (Goldie, 
                                                          
17 He might, of course, feel proud of his personal contribution.  
18 See footnote 9. As I indicated there, there is room for debate about this; but this is not an issue I 
can pursue here. 
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2000: 12); and it seems a small step from there to suppose that emotions include processes of 
thought. Indeed, if an emotion is itself a process, it might make more sense to view its cognitive 
components as processes, rather than discrete mental acts. But if a complex process theorist regards 
processes of reasoning or reflection as components of the emotion, then they have some reason to 
allow that emotions might include collective reasoning and reflection too.  
It might be objected, perhaps, that the two cases are not as closely analogous as I am 
implying. In particular, individual processes of reasoning and reflection are internal psychological 
processes, involving only the thoughts of the individual subject. Collective reasoning, in contrast, is a 
public, social phenomenon: it involves people saying or doing certain things, and perceiving and 
understanding each other’s behaviour. Still, it is not clear that the contrast is as stark as this implies. 
After all, individual cognition is not always confined to the head: people sometimes think out loud; 
they solve problems by manipulating objects and symbols. Moreover, as I have stressed, complex 
process theorists already take emotions to include non-psychological components. Hence, a complex 
process theorist need not be committed to the view that the cognitive components of emotions are 
always purely internal psychological processes, even in cases involving a single subject. If so, this 
suggested disanalogy between individual and collective emotional cognition is not as significant as it 
might seem.   
In this chapter, I have identified two kinds of collective emotional phenomena – collective 
emotional actions and collective emotional cognition; I have argued that these phenomena depend, 
in part, on our capacity for expressive behaviour. These collective emotional phenomena, I take it, 
are significant in their own right; but they also point to some further conclusions. In particular, I have 
suggested that Salmela’s account of shared emotion should be extended to take more account of 
emotional action and cognition. I have also suggested that a good case can be made for the claim 
that emotional responses can sometimes have a collective component or stage; moreover, on a 
complex process theory, a case could perhaps be made for emotions themselves. If so, expressive 
behaviour has the power to extend, not only the influence of emotion, but its boundaries too. 
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